Recent Regulations for the Abusive Conduct of Market Dominating Enterprises by Böge, Ulf
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
2004 
Recent Regulations for the Abusive Conduct of Market 
Dominating Enterprises 
Ulf Böge 
Bundeskartellamt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Comparative and Foreign Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ulf Böge, Recent Regulations for the Abusive Conduct of Market Dominating Enterprises, 3 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 429 (2004), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/13 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
429 
RECENT REGULATIONS FOR THE ABUSIVE 
CONDUCT OF MARKET DOMINATING 
ENTERPRISES† 
DR. ULF BÖGE* 
In Germany, abuse control of dominant companies has been embodied 
in competition law since the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) 
entered into force in 1958.1 Incidentally, the competition rules of the 
European Community came into effect in that same year.2 Abuse control, 
together with the general ban on cartels (including restrictive agreements) 
represents the traditional foundation of German competition law. The 
instrument of merger control, on the other hand, was introduced in 
Germany fifteen years later3 and not until 1990 in the EU.4 The three main 
pillars upholding current German competition law are the enforcement of 
the ban on cartels, along with merger control and abuse control of 
dominant companies. 
The ban on cartels is critically important in Germany because of the 
development of national competition and the structure of the German 
economy. Since the nineteenth century, cartel agreements have been 
widespread in the German economy. However, the ARC sought to end the 
cartel-related practices, some of which dominated entire industries. 
Agreements between companies aimed at eliminating competition have 
been prohibited since 1958 and are punished with substantial fines.5 
Restrictive agreements between competitors are allowed only in 
exceptional cases and subject to clearly defined criteria.6 
 
 
 † Speech on the occasion of the International Conference on Competition Policy and Economic 
Development held by the Institute of Law Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the topic on 
September 19, 2002 in Beijing. 
 * President of the Bundeskartellamt. 
 1. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Act Against Restraints of Competition], 
v.27.7.1957 (BGB1.I 1081) (W. Ger.) [hereinafter ARC]. 
 2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 81 et seq. 
(1997). 
 3. Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [The Second 
Law amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition], v. 3.8.1973 (BGB1.I 917) (W. Ger.). 
 4. Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC, Dec. 21, 1989, On the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 257) 1. 
 5. An overview of the fines imposed on participants in hardcore cartels since 1993 can be found 
in the Biannual Report 2001/2002 of the Bundeskartellamt (table at 44) that can be downloaded from 
the Bundeskartellamt’s website: www.bundeskartellamt.de/tatigkeitsbericht.html, or from the German 
Parliament’s website: http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/15/012/1501226.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
 6. See ARC v.27.7.1957, § 2-7 (BGB1.I 1081-82), as amended, latest official consolidated 
version: BGB1.I2521 (1998), latest amendment: BGB1.I2304 (2003). 
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Merger control was not addressed in the original version of the ARC. 
However, it was clear at that time that mergers often led to considerable 
competition problems. The acquisition of another company is often the 
cheapest and fastest path towards company growth. Merging parties hope 
to achieve a competitive advantage in terms of turnover—for example, by 
acquiring additional market shares—and in terms of costs, which they 
expect to decrease due to synergy produced by the merger. 
Mergers do not always lead to success. On the one hand, they can 
increase the efficiency of a new entity, especially if markets are 
undergoing change, thus spurring competition. However, one should not 
rely on the idea that sheer size in the market guarantees entrepreneurial 
success. Studies show that quite the opposite is true in an excessive 
number of cases.7 On the other hand, mergers between competitors may 
lead to market dominance or a monopoly. When competition is brought to 
a standstill, consumers are no longer ensured a benefit from increased 
efficiency. 
The aim of merger control is to prevent the creation of dominant 
positions as a result of mergers and to secure competitive market 
structures. If this fails, the only recourse is abuse control of dominant 
companies.8  
I. INDIVIDUAL ISSUES OF ABUSE CONTROL 
To illustrate the German experience with abuse control of dominant 
companies, this section will briefly outline three examples: (1) the ban on 
sales below cost price; (2) the control of buyer power in the public sector; 
and, (3) the control of state monopolies as suppliers. 
A. Sales Below Cost Price 
A special feature of German competition policy is that abuse control 
applies not only to companies that have attained a dominant position, 
rather it also applies to those companies with a relatively powerful 
 
 
 7. For an overview on post-merger studies, see for example, Gunther Tichy, “Fusionen und 
Übernahmen: Erfolġsaussichten von Fusionen,” Wien 2000, available at http://www.akwien.at/dat/ 
3842_2.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2004); Lajoux & Weston, Do deals deliver on postmerger 
performance?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Sept.-Oct., 1998, available at http://www.findarticles.com/ 
m6402/n2_33/issue.jhtml (last visited Jan. 3, 2004). 
 8. Of course, an instrument of control is also needed for cases in which a company achieves a 
dominant position through internal growth. 
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position.9 For example, powerful companies may not unfairly hinder their 
competitors or those companies dependent on them by frequently selling 
their products below cost price, unless there is an objective justification 
for doing so.10 
The following case illustrates how this special German policy feature is 
implemented. In 2000, the Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel 
Office) examined the pricing strategy of three major trading companies 
that sold basic foodstuffs such as sugar, milk and flour below their 
respective cost prices over a considerable period of time, without any 
perceptible objective justification.11 According to the Bundeskartellamt’s 
findings, the three trading companies had superior market power over 
small and medium-sized independent food retailers due to their 
companies’ sizes, market shares, and resources. As a result of these 
findings, the Bundeskartellamt prohibited the pricing practice of these 
trading companies. However, the issue here was not protecting individual 
companies from competition, but protecting overall competition and the 
long-term interests of consumers. 
At first glance, it is not obvious why low prices can be unfavorable for 
consumers. Our examinations show, however, that the material benefit to 
consumers resulting from sales below cost price are, at most, temporary 
and marginal. The results for the consumers are temporary because market 
concentration will increase after the exit of small and medium-sized 
competitors. As a result, the remaining competitors will gain greater 
leverage to increase prices for not only a few basic foodstuffs, but also for 
all of the other thousands of products sold by the trading companies. The 
benefits for the consumers are marginal because expenses for the 
foodstuffs examined comprise only a very small share of an average 
household’s budget, in some cases accounting for less than one percent. At 
the same time, the impairment of competition and market structures 
resulting from unfair hindrance of small and medium-sized companies is 
permanent and appreciable. 
The competition authority’s task is to maintain effective competition in 
the medium and long-term in the interest of consumers. Competition is the 
most effective instrument for ensuring alternative supply options and high 
 
 
 9. ARC v. 27.7.1957, (BGB1.I. 2521 (1998)), § 20 (as amended). 
 10. Id. § 20(4). 
 11. See Decision of Sept. 1, 2000, Bundeskartellamt [BKartA] (Federal Cartel Office [FCO]), 
WuW/E [BKartA] B9-85/00 (Aldi-Nord), DE-V 314; Decision of Sept. 1, 2000, FCO, WuW/E 
[BKartA] B9-74/00 (Wal-Mart), DE-V 316 (see BUNDESKARTELLAMT, BIANNUAL REPORT 
1999/2000, at 147 et seq.). Decisions of the Bundeskartellamt (since 1998) can be downloaded from its 
website: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/ entscheidungen.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
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quality products at low prices for consumers. This can only be achieved if 
independent businesses can operate efficiently under fair competition 
conditions and are not squeezed out of the market by large corporations 
with superior financial and market power that practice unfair strategies. 
The issue is not about establishing a price control regime for trading 
companies. All the companies in the market are, in principle, free to 
calculate their own prices. Whether a company covers its procurement 
costs or not, or whether it makes a profit or loses money, are questions that 
concern the company’s management, not the competition authorities; 
competition authorities only intervene in individual cases if there is a 
reasonable suspicion of market power abuse that affects competition. 
It is crucial for effective enforcement of competition principles that the 
companies in a market are aware of the criteria by which a competition 
authority judges their behavior. As a result of its initial investigations, the 
Bundeskartellamt issues a notice (principles of interpretation) regarding 
sales below cost price, which details the assessment criteria that are 
applied.12  
B. Demand by the Public Sector 
Private companies are not the only entities subject to competition 
law—the State has to respect competition law regulations if it purchases 
business services in the market or itself acts as a supplier.  
For example, in 1997, the Bundeskartellamt intervened in a case 
because a regional government branch abused its position as a purchaser 
of construction work and impeded particular companies in an unfair 
manner.13 The federal government branch in Berlin issued administrative 
provisions that ruled out wage levels as a competition parameter in the 
awarding of public contracts in the building sector. The court held that all 
companies submitting bids in a tender for a public building contract had to 
commit themselves to paying the collectively agreed upon wages 
applicable for Berlin, which were quite high. However, the 
Bundeskartellamt considered this to be an abusive hindrance for those 
companies not bound by the Berlin level of collectively agreed wages. The 
Berlin government’s conduct was not necessary to achieve the original 
 
 
 12. The notice is published on the Bundeskartellamt’s website: http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/ 
merkblatter.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
 13. Decision of Nov. 3, 1997, Bundeskartellamt, WuW/E [BKartA] Verg 7, B5-75123-VX-61/95 
(Tariftreueerklärung). 
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aim of its regulation—to prevent so-called wage dumping—because this is 
prohibited in the construction sector by a separate legal provision. 
C. Market Behavior of a National Monopoly 
Germany’s long-term policy is to withdraw from certain 
entrepreneurial activities in order to allow for privatization. For example, 
the German State once completely controlled the telecommunications and 
postal service sectors until these entities were transformed into 
corporations. Initially, the German State held 100 percent of these 
corporations’ shares; these shares are now being gradually privatized. 
Another German state-run administration transformed into a corporation is 
the railway sector. Deutsche Bahn AG is the integrated railway company 
in Germany that provides rail transportation services and owns the 
necessary infrastructure—Deutsche Bahn is also owned entirely by the 
German State. Nevertheless, as a state-owned company, it is also subject 
to the provisions of competition law. 
Accordingly, Deutsche Bahn, as the dominant operator of the railway 
network, is obliged to grant competitors non-discriminatory access to its 
infrastructure network. Competitors must pay Deutsche Bahn a fee for 
using its infrastructure and it is up to the company itself to develop an 
adequate pricing system, which must not be discriminatory. 
In 2000, pursuant to complaints, the Bundeskartellamt examined 
Deutsche Bahn’s pricing system. The investigations established that the 
costs incurred by Deutsche Bahn’s own local transport subsidiary for 
using rail routes were on average twenty-five percent (in some cases more 
than forty percent) lower than those of its private competitors.  
In the Bundeskartellamt’s view, Deutsche Bahn, as the dominant 
provider of railway infrastructure, violated the ban on abusive practices 
because it unfairly hindered private railway companies in the market from 
providing short-distance passenger transportation. Due to the 
Bundeskartellamt’s concerns, it required Deutsche Bahn to introduce a 
new pricing system that currently does not give rise to competition 
concerns.14 
 
 
 14. The case could be closed without a formal decision. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, BIANNUAL 
REPORT 1999/2000, supra note 5, at 39-40, 151-52. 
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II. ABUSE CONTROL IN THE ENERGY SECTOR15 
A. Liberalization of the Network-Based Energy Sector 
Abuse control under competition law plays a key role in the network-
based energy sector. Since the 1980s, there have been intensive 
discussions in Europe as to whether and how traditionally monopolistic 
sectors, such as electricity and natural gas supply, should be subjected to 
competition regulation. Meanwhile, the prevailing view in Europe is that 
electricity and gas networks are natural monopolies and therefore cannot 
easily be duplicated in an economically rational way. Consequently, 
creating competition by building a new infrastructure must be ruled out in 
most cases. Nevertheless, the supply of customers may well function 
under competitive conditions. Therefore, in the area of utility services 
provided by existing networks, there are no economies of scale or 
indivisibility factors that would render competition impossible. 
In 1998, in the course of liberalization measures decided in Europe,16 
Germany abolished the legal hurdles that stood in the way of establishing 
competition, completely opened up its markets to competition, and took 
the steps necessary to push ahead with the creation of effective 
competition.17 
 
 
 15. Recent important legislative developments regarding the energy sector include the 
amendment of the Energy Industry Act. Gesetz zur Änderung des Energiewirtschaftsgesetzes [Act to 
Revise the Energy Law] v.20.5.2003 (BGB1.I. 686). The Act made some major changes. First, 
Bundeskartellamt decisions ordering access to the grid will in theory be immediately enforceable 
(prior to the revision, legal action automatically suspended the decision). Second, the provisions of the 
most recent Associations’ Agreement in the electricity sector have been given a quasi-legal status for a 
transition period until the end of 2003. They are presumed to reflect an acceptable standard unless it 
can be shown that they restrict competition. Furthermore, a report by the Ministry of Economics and 
Labor will address the question of regulation in the electricity sector. This report will form the basis 
for implementation of the new Energy Directives, European Parliament and Council Directive 
2003/54/EC, June 26, 2003, Concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
repealing Directive 96/92/EC, O.J. (L 176), July 15, 2003, at 37; European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2003/55/EC, June 26, 2003, Concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, O.J. (L 176), July 15, 2003, at 57. 
 16. European Parliament and Council Directive 96/92/EC, Dec. 19, 1996, Concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity, 1997 O.J. (L 27), at 20. 
 17. The relevant provisions in the Energy Industry Act and in the ARC were amended in Gesetz 
zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsgesetzes [Act to revise the Energy Law] v.24.4. 1998 (BGB1.I 
730); Sechstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [The Sixth Law 
amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition], v.22.8.1998 (BGB1.I 2521). 
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B. Structure of the German Electricity Sector 
The German electricity sector is characterized by a large number of 
regional companies, some of which are vertically integrated, operating at 
different production and sales levels. 
German energy suppliers used to have regional monopolies permitted 
by law and the structure of these monopolies has changed very little over 
the decades. At the time, there was practically no competition and it was 
only with the abolition of the application of special regulation to this 
sector that competitive pressure emerged. The opening up of the market 
and subsequent mergers of energy suppliers led to changes in the market 
structure. This process has recently become considerably more dynamic. 
In comparison with other European countries, however, the German 
electricity sector is still very fragmented—there are more than 800 
companies distributing electricity in Germany. 
C. Strategies to Create Competition in the Electricity Sector 
In April of 1998, Germany abolished all privileges under competition 
law for the network-based energy sector.18 In particular, this put an end to 
the electric companies’ right to exclude competition by means of 
demarcation agreements and terminated the right of municipal authorities 
to grant exclusive concessions to a single company for the supply of 
electricity in their territory. In opening up its markets, Germany clearly 
went beyond the minimum provisions of European law. From the outset, 
competition was possible at all market levels and for all customers: large 
industrial customers, smaller commercial customers, and households.  
A decisive precondition for competition is that energy suppliers must 
have non-discriminatory and free or reasonably priced access to the 
networks of established energy providers. Only then will consumers be 
able to switch to a new supplier. In principle, two alternative approaches 
are possible under European law on an equal-rights basis: regulated 
network access and negotiated network access. 
In the case of regulated network access, the state prescribes all of the 
relevant details for network access, particularly the fees for network use. 
Regulatory authorities charged specifically with carrying out this task, 
generally secure the practical implementation of these details. 
 
 
 18. The Sixth Law amending the Act Against Restraints of Competition, BGB1.I 2521 (1998). 
The exemption for restrictive agreements, in particular demarcation agreements, in the electricity and 
gas sectors was removed. ARC v.27.7.1957, § 103 (as amended). 
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Germany, however, opted for negotiated network access: the State only 
prescribes general framework conditions, which were especially affected 
by the abolishment of former privileges under competition law. The 
negotiation of network access and transmission modalities is left to the 
market participants. In terms of competition, this approach to liberalization 
is secured by a consistent application of abuse control under competition 
law. Network operators are usually considered to be dominant companies 
required to grant other energy providers access to their networks. 
This approach to liberalization lets the market decide. Primarily, 
market participants are most familiar with market conditions, and they 
ensure that the market process functions correctly, and are able to react 
more quickly to changing conditions in their negotiations than the state 
could, for example, through the promulgation of regulations. The 
liberalization strategy chosen does justice to the structural conditions of 
the German energy sector; in contrast to other European countries, no 
single monopolist provider ever existed in Germany. Instead, when 
liberalization was introduced, there were already a large number of energy 
companies that had market experience at all levels. However, these 
companies had yet to enter into intensive competition with each other.  
Fundamental elements in determining transmission fees in the 
electricity sector are the so-called “Associations’ Agreements.” These 
agreements are decided by the representatives of important economic 
associations of both sides: the associations of the energy industry sector on 
the supply side, and the associations of the industrial energy consumers on 
the demand side. 
D. Results Achieved so Far by Opening Up Electricity Markets to 
Competition 
The purpose of opening up electricity markets is to increase the 
efficiency of services provided in the energy supply sector by means of 
competition. Initially, customers consuming a high amount of energy 
profit from this and private consumers ultimately also benefit from 
increased competition that results in lower prices. In fact, competition 
forces energy providers to pass on cost advantages to their consumers 
through lower prices. 
In some electricity markets, particularly in the case of large energy 
consumption customers, competition has already produced good results. 
At times, electricity prices for industrial customers fell by as much as fifty 
percent. As end consumers, private households have also profited directly 
because of the reductions in electricity prices (although the reductions are 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/13
p429 Boge book pages.doc  2/11/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] MARKET DOMINATING ENTERPRISES 437 
 
 
 
 
smaller than those for large energy consumption customers). End 
consumers have also profited indirectly because industrial electricity 
customers’ cost savings are passed on to end consumers in lower product 
prices. 
Nevertheless, there are problems in implementing competition, 
especially in the markets of small customers and households. Here, the 
control that established providers still exercise over end consumers proves 
to be a significant barrier for each new entrant. 
E. Abuse Control by the Bundeskartellamt in the Electricity Sector 
Germany’s approach to opening up electricity markets via negotiated 
network access, which promises to be successful, is secured by the 
competition authorities’ supervision. In the initial stages of liberalizing the 
electricity markets, the main problem from a competition point of view, 
was that established network operators refused to grant their competitors 
access to the electricity network. The Bundeskartellamt conducted several 
proceedings making it clear that a general refusal to open up networks is 
unacceptable.19 Today, refusals to grant access have practically ceased to 
be an issue. 
Other abusive strategies applied by established companies with the aim 
of hindering new entrants have also been successfully restricted. These 
strategies include the so-called “transfer fees” that certain providers 
previously charged customers who signed a supply contract with a new 
provider, claiming that customers wishing to switch over to a new supplier 
had to have a special electricity meter installed.20 
The main problem has proven to be that network operators charge other 
companies excessive fees for network use, in particular network access for 
transmission purposes. It is undisputed that network operators are entitled 
to a fee if other companies use their networks for the transmission of 
electricity. The pivotal issue, from a competition point of view, is the level 
of this fee: if network operators charge unreasonably high prices, the effect 
will be similar to that of an outright refusal to grant network access. 
With a new division specifically set up for this task in 2001, the 
Bundeskartellamt intensified examination under competition law of fees 
for network use in the electricity sector.21 Following preliminary 
 
 
 19. See Decision of Aug. 30, 1999, Bundeskartellamt, WuW/E [BKartA] DE-V 149 (Berliner 
Stromdurchleitung).  
 20. See BKARTA, BIANNUAL REPORT 2001/2002, supra note 5, at 139. 
 21. Id. at 37. 
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examination proceedings in which the fees of twenty-three network 
operators were reviewed, the Bundeskartellamt is currently conducting ten 
formal proceedings against network operators.22 
It has become apparent during these proceedings that many 
unanswered questions remain. An important question relates to which 
standard a competition authority should apply in order to assess whether or 
not a particular fee is abusively high. In this respect, the Bundeskartellamt 
relies mostly on the comparable market concept. This means that the 
authority chooses one particular network operator that is considered to be 
efficient and whose network fees are deemed to be favorable as the 
standard by which other companies shall be judged. Corrective 
calculations must be made in individual cases as network and customer 
structures are far from being uniform enough to allow for an easy 
comparison of prices. 
Naturally, it cannot be ignored that the fees charged by a company 
representing the standard may be considered excessive at a later date, 
requiring said company to adjust its fees for network use on the basis of an 
improved standard. Cross-border comparisons would be helpful in this 
context, but this will take time to develop. The Bundeskartellamt prefers 
this concept, which relies on a comparison of prices in the market as 
opposed to direct cost control, although it will resort to examining costs if 
deemed unavoidable. 
There are further questions that will need clarification in future 
proceedings of the competition authority and of the courts, relating, for 
example, to the obligation of companies under examination to answer 
questions and the treatment of business secrets. 
The examination of fees by means of abuse control under competition 
law proves to be a difficult yet indispensable task. There is no perceptible 
alternative solution that would be preferable to this approach in the case of 
the German electricity industry. The comprehensive regulation of fees and 
conditions for network use implemented in other countries does not appear 
to be practical in Germany. The sheer number of network operators in 
Germany (in the hundreds), would make the effort involved prohibitively 
high. In addition, a regulator cannot easily answer the key question, “What 
is the adequate price for network use in individual cases?” 
Setting a wrong price poses considerable dangers: excessively high 
fees hinder new suppliers from entering the market and competition 
cannot help the industry evolve. However, if fees are set too low, the 
 
 
 22. Id. at 166-68. 
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network operator will not be able to achieve an adequate return flow of 
funds for the maintenance and operation of its infrastructure, and 
necessary investments will not be made. The decentralized approach of 
negotiated network access leaves it to the market participants to find an 
adequate price for network use on the basis of a market-oriented 
procedure. Abuse control under competition law would only intervene 
selectively. 
In the case of a comprehensive regulation of fees, a regulator must try 
to compensate for the overall knowledge within the market that influences 
the negotiated approach. Moreover, misdirected action by a regulator will 
have far-reaching consequences as its decisions, right or wrong, will very 
quickly affect all network operators. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This overview illustrates the broad range of areas that are covered by 
abuse control under German competition law. Abuse control deals with the 
conduct of suppliers and purchasers, and applies to a wide range of sectors 
including public institutions, public enterprises, and private companies. 
Despite all differences and particularities in individual cases, one 
principle always applies: the object of abuse control is to keep markets 
open by limiting the scope of action for dominant companies. Only then 
can competition be ensured as the most effective instrument to achieve 
optimum market results—quality service and low prices for customers—in 
a cost-efficient way and by using competition authorities’ resources 
economically. This is a central precondition for economic growth. 
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